The Athletic Football Show breaks down The offensive environment Ward is going to/2024 offensive scheme breakdown

[NashvilleNinja]

1 hour ago, IsntLifeFunny said:

It was just a horrible set of plays. They got to the one and a half. They were closer than I thought. You get up on the line run it down to 35 seconds and run the ball if you don't get it you get back on the line and QB sneak if you got closer or run the hurry up. Then you still have a TO and 4th down. No way you take it out of Lynch's hands. Not a chance. 

 

Everyone has the luxury of second guessing a call from the couch of a coach in the final minute of the Super Bowl. But for every chance you take the ball out of Lynch's hands there's an equal chance they stuff Lynch on any attempts made to run it in. And had it played out that way everyone would still be criticizing Carol for not having the balls to throw it over the mountain of men at the LOS expecting Lynch up the middle.

 

Maybe it was just the Patriots day that day regardless.

[IsntLifeFunny]

30 minutes ago, NashvilleNinja said:

 

Everyone has the luxury of second guessing a call from the couch of a coach in the final minute of the Super Bowl. But for every chance you take the ball out of Lynch's hands there's an equal chance they stuff Lynch on any attempts made to run it in. And had it played out that way everyone would still be criticizing Carol for not having the balls to throw it over the mountain of men at the LOS expecting Lynch up the middle.

 

Maybe it was just the Patriots day that day regardless.

I mean yeah if they run it 3 times and can't get what about 4 and a half feet then yeah I guess it would have played out like that. They had enough time and timeouts to make sure they got 4 plays. That's the point. 

[rns90]

5 hours ago, BudsOilers said:

No - their defense was depleted and gassed.  They were playing their 4th string CB and a FB on the DL.......NE had scored 14 points in the 4th and were humming.  They wanted to bleed the clock to not let NE have the ball with a chance to score.

 

 

It’s been years since I’ve watched it but this I remember. Their defense got shredded in the fourth and NE just moved up and down.

[IsntLifeFunny]

1 hour ago, rns90 said:

It’s been years since I’ve watched it but this I remember. Their defense got shredded in the fourth and NE just moved up and down.

Yeah and you have 3 plays to score from inside the 2...better make sure to score on second! 

[OILERMAN]

6 hours ago, TheBukafax said:

I really hope you didn’t spend your time reading an Annie Duke book lol.

 

She is Grade A certified retarded. Her and her brother should both be in prison.

 

She's crooked but she isn't retarded, she's super smart. Her analysis on this are spot on 

[oldschool]

19 hours ago, Callidus said:

How deep into your ass did you have to dig to find those made up numbers? 

 

Chatgpt hallucinating again...

[Mythos27]

I'm still torn on that pick six play. In my heart of hearts, I think they probably win the game if they run. At the same time, I don't think that the passing play was a bad idea because 2nd down was literally the only down where a pass would not have been obvious and an incomplete pass there is harmless. Too much is made of the decision and not enough of how incredibly unlikely it was for it to result in a pick. BB also had their number on this one because they practiced a lot against that particular play/look all week during practice. Kearse couldn't get the contact necessary because Butler was anticipating the play, recognized it immediately, and came down-hill to the catch point with 0 hesitation. It was a combination of preparation and execution that you rarely see. It also made Richard Sherman cry like a little bitch so I'll always remember the play fondly. 

[BudsOilers]

A couple of notes because I know this play well and it's probably one of the most misunderstood plays of all time because of the end result bias.  The strategy and decision was fine.  

 

Seattle's starting FB was injured in the playoffs hence they had a back end roster guy playing there situationally.  Problem was that the DL got decimated in the SB so that "FB" was playing "DT" in the 4th quarter of the game when NE was moving at will.  Of note, a Red Zone 3rd and 1 run from Lynch earlier in the game from a heavy set was stopped for no gain and they settled for a FG.

 

NE also had all 3 TO's left and in the scenario where Seattle scored a TD to go up 31-28 (or 30-28 if XP was missed), NE had plenty of time to get into FG range or even be in position to take a couple of shots to score a winning TD at the end.  Hence, after Lynch was stopped on the 1st down run and NE opted to let the clock keep running, Seattle pivoted to let the clock bleed to minimize the risk of that scenario I just laid out.  On top of it, they had their one TO left so a pass play there made more sense than a failed run where you have to burn a TO and lose the run/pass option.

[Downtown]

New England only had 2 timeouts. 

 

 

[BudsOilers]

Thought it was 3 but still doesn't materially change the situation at that point.

[Supernope]

Vrabel would have taken the field goal with the plan to get the ball back and score again

[BudsOilers]

Actually speaking of Vrabel, he twice did what BB did not using TO's and letting clock bleed down banking on a defensive stop.  Now in all 3 cases, the defense did make the stop and win the game but that's independent of the clock management decisions.

[Downtown]

SI did a good breakdown back in the day.

 

Its not a flawed plan to pass on 2nd, but the Seahawks were stuck once they started milking the clock. According to Malcolm Butler, Bevel also tipped his hand by having 3 receivers on the field which signaled pass as they don't run out of 3 receivers in goal-line.

 

Bill was actually the one who screwed up in win probability by not calling a timeout after the first down run by Marshawn. He let Seahawks dictate the clock with timeouts in his pocket. 

 

 

https://www.si.com/nfl/2015/02/04/russell-wilson-super-bowl-49-interception-statistical-analysis

 

The Logic

In the NFL, with man-to-man coverage, the advantage goes to the offense. After burning two timeouts earlier in the drive, and with only 26 seconds remaining, it was not really feasible for the Seahawks to run the ball three straight plays. If they ran the ball on second down and failed, they would need to call their final timeout. Without a timeout, if they ran and were stopped on third down, it is unlikely they would have time to lineup for a fourth-down attempt. There are massive pileups at the goal line and it takes a while to get unpiled and set up. Obviously, three plays to score the go-ahead touchdown are better than two.

 

In Defense of Darrell Bevell

They had the right look for the slant to work, the interception that clinched Super Bowl 49 was more a function of Seattle's limited personnel.

So, it appears the Seahawks would need to throw the ball on either second or third down to ensure three attempts. By throwing on second down and conserving their timeout, the Patriots would still have to play for either the pass or the run on third down. If they ran on second down, the Seahawks would almost surely pass on third down—which simplifies things for Bill Belichick’s defense.

 

The Execution

Every time I watch the play, I’m more and more convinced it was actually the execution that could have been better, rather than the play call. Ricardo Lockette runs a quick slant behind Jermaine Kearse, who tries (and fails) to set a pick for him. Lockette is certainly open, but Butler makes a tremendous break on the ball, somehow coming up with the interception.

 

If Wilson throws that ball into Lockette’s chest, like a quarterback is supposed to do on that throw, that's a touchdown (or, worst case, an incompletion). If Lockette goes in stronger and anticipates the contact—which it appeared he did not—he’s in position for a touchdown as well (or, worst case, an incompletion).

 

It’s up to the quarterback and the receiver to make sure the defender has to go through the back of the receiver in order to make a play on the slant. While this is not the exact same situation (since they are at the 11-yard line, not the goal line), look where Tom Brady puts this ball on the slant to Brandon LaFell for a touchdown earlier in the game. Also, look at how LaFell has positioned himself between the ball and the corner.

 

The Stats

Enough qualitative analysis—what do the numbers say? If you recall earlier this year, we wrote about goal-to-go scenarios after the Eagles chose to pass the ball instead of run it at the goal line against the 49ers. Since 2000, teams on the 1-yard line have run the ball 74.0% of the time and were successful 53.9% of the time. Teams passing succeeded 48.3% of the time.

This year, both numbers were significantly higher. Teams ran in 129 touchdowns on 226 attempts (57.1%) and threw 66 touchdowns on 115 attempts (57.4%). But keep in mind, one year of data is still a pretty small sample size. 2013’s touchdown rate was just 49.5%, so there can be dramatic shifts from year to year.

 

Plenty of Blame to Go Around

A coach’s call has been getting all of the attention, but three Seahawks players deserve their share of wrath for the Super Bowl-losing interception. Here's what Jermaine Kearse, Ricardo Lockette and Russell Wilson did wrong.

 

Many are citing the fact that this was the first interception on the goal line all year. Historically, though, interceptions occur on 3.1% of passing plays from the 1-yard line. The biggest difference between rushing and passing on the goal line is the potential for bad outcomes. Large rushing losses are not common on dive plays, only fumbles. With a pass play, there are interceptions, sacks, and fumbles. Since 2000, sacks occurred on 4.4% of pass plays from the 1. Fumbles (both lost and recovered by the offense) occurred on 3.1% of rushing plays and 1.0% of pass plays (about half of those resulted in turnovers).

 

Our internal efficiency metric at numberFire.com, Net Expected Points (NEP) tells us that rushing plays at the 1 average +0.15 NEP per attempt, while pass plays lose -0.05 per drop back. That’s a one-point difference for every five plays.

These league-wide baselines are a great starting point, but unfortunately, they do not take into account the specific teams playing, score differential, time remaining, or personnel groupings.

 

In 2014, the Patriots faced seven plays at the goal line (six rush, one pass). They surrendered six touchdowns (five on rushes, one through the air). The Seahawks ran nine plays from the goal line, running the ball seven times (scoring just three times, 42.9%) and throwing twice (scoring once). These sample sizes are clearly far too small to draw any conclusions.

 

Last, let’s look at the specific situation: down by four to eight points (one possession but more than a field goal) with under one minute remaining. Since 2000, there are 73 such situations with a success rate of just 42.5%—dramatically lower than the rest of the game. Passes converted 48.5% of the time and rushes a measly 37.5% on 40 attempts. This is, of course, another small sample size issue and there is a slight sample bias in that the trailing team will typically be the less-efficient team. If we look at all trailing teams, that expands the sample to 153 plays: 41.1% pass success, 43.0% run success. It’s also worth noting that the pass-to-run ratio is much closer to 50-50 in these end-of-game situations.

In short-yardage situations, running the ball is generally the better option. But, teams cannot run the ball every time, as there is a huge element of game theory in play calling. Offenses try to capitalize and increase their odds with specific matchups (like man-to-man coverage).

There does appear to be a decline in conversion rates in these high-stress situations, when quick but critical judgments need to be made. We would need more data, though, to truly verify this theory.

The Seahawks probably should have run the ball—although that’s much easier to say with hindsight on our side. Conversion rates are higher and thus, the Seahawks chances of winning would be higher, we estimate by about 5.6%. But, was the decision to throw the ball the worst play call in history? Not even close.

If the Seahawks score there, no one thinks twice about the decision. Instead, Belichick would be ridiculed for the blatant mistake of not taking his timeouts once the Seahawks were in a goal-to-go scenario. But the interception happened, so it’s Carroll taking the heat.

[BudsOilers]

As stated many times, the play failed on poor execution by the Seahawks.  Yes NE correctly diagnosed the play but if it's executed by Seattle it would not matter.

 

And BB not using the TO's was a bigger fail than the pass play call.

[pat]

BB let the clock run to pressure the Seahawks.  It worked, they fell into bad habits, and BB won.